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I was brought up in the belief that you should not
sign anything you had not read. (After some
years in legal practice I realised that this was a
layman’s misunderstanding of the original legal
maxim, that you should not sign anything that
your lawyer had not read.) The layman’s version
of the maxim is certainly sound, and for paper
documents it is fairly simple to know whether you
have complied with it or not. Things are not so
straightforward when it comes to electronic
documents and electronic signatures: this article
is about some of the pitfalls which may confound
the unwary. The electronic documents that I have
in mind are mainly those produced by word-
processing software, and the electronic
signatures are the digital signatures made using
public key cryptography.
Analogy between electronic and holograph
signatures 
It is worth noticing at the outset some of the ways in
which the analogy between a handwritten signature
and a digital signature is less than perfect. A
handwritten signature is strongly bound to its maker.
The utility of such signatures rests on a general
acceptance that they are very hard to forge
undetectably (given the availability of time and skill to
examine the forgery). Unless a whole document is
handwritten, however, the signature’s resistance to
forgery does not by itself provide any very strong
assurance that changes to the rest of the document will
be detected if made after the signature. A digital
signature, by contrast, gives a very strong assurance of
integrity - the slightest change to the document will
prevent the signature from being verified.  But the
digital signature is only weakly bound to the signatory,
since the binding depends on the ability of the
signatory (a) to exclude others from obtaining access to
the signature key and (b) to ensure that the signature
creation device uses the key only to sign documents
the signatory intends to sign. In a world of insecure
devices and prevalent malicious software, neither
result may be easy to achieve.
Any system of signing documents with digital
signatures must satisfy two distinct requirements. The
first is that a signature on a document must continue to
be capable of verification for as long as its validity may
be material to anyone with an interest in it. The second
is that what the signatory appears to have signed is the
same as what the signatory intended to sign.
In-line and detached signatures 
Subsection 7(2) of the Electronic Communications Act
2000 (UK) provides that:
(2) For the purposes of this section an electronic 
signature is so much of anything in electronic form
as-
(a) is incorporated into or otherwise logically
associated with any electronic communication or
electronic data; and
(b) purports to be so incorporated or associated for
the purpose of being used in establishing the
authenticity of the communication or data, the
integrity of the communication or data, or both.
This elegant definition reflects alternative forms of
signature, the in-line signature (where the text to be
signed and the signature itself appear as text in the
same document), and the detached signature (where
the file containing the document is signed and the
signature takes the form of a separate file).
An example of an in-line signature is the following:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Specimen of signed text
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 7.0
iQA/AwUBRB6O1AkSrmaJndf/EQKLpACfU8cFAg1
QI2SP/vQbj1BvVmQQ1GUAn3cd
1XfDSSLvTCR07DoiLCwAV2CW
WRITTEN BY: NICHOLAS BOHM
WATCH WHAT
YOU SIGN!
ARTICLE:
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=iqNY
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
A detached signature will appear in the list of files:
In this case a document called “Mutable.doc” has been
signed, the signature being contained in the document
“Mutable.doc.sig”. Nothing in Mutable.doc gives any
indication that it has been signed, because it is not
changed by the making of the signature.
In each case the software used to create the
signature can also be used to verify it.
Reliability and vulnerabilities 
False documents that verify correctly 
There is a significant difference between the two
methods of signature. The in-line signature contains
and reveals the whole of the text that has been signed.
In the case of the software used to generate the
specimen above, PGP 7.0, it operates only on text,
eliminating formatting such as colour or italics. This
may seem a little crude, but it has an important
advantage. An example might be a document
presented to you for signature containing hidden text,
displayed in white on a white background. You might
be satisfied with the visible text, and create an in-line
signature; but this would convert the hidden text from
white to black, revealing what you had really signed
before you had released it.
As this example shows, the security properties of a
procedure can only be analysed in the context of
conjectural attacks on it. A more sophisticated attack
might be to produce a document (the primary
document) displaying text acceptable for signature,
part of which is not in fact contained in the primary
document in the form of text, but is displayed there as
the result of the placing in the primary document of a
link to a secondary document file which contains the
text. Once again the comparative crudity of the in-line
signature is valuable.  Because the link does not
consist of text, the in-line signature procedure simply
discards it, and the text in the linked secondary file is
not included in the signature.
(One might ask what advantage the attacker might
hope to gain from including the text through a link in
this indirect way: the answer is that if the attacker has
control of the secondary file to which the link connects
the primary document, he can alter the displayed
content of the primary document by altering the text in
the secondary document without making any change to
the primary document.)
A detached signature operates differently. Instead of
operating purely on text, it operates on the whole file,
treating it as an electronic object, a collection of bits.
As an example, consider the case of the primary
document, part of which consists of a link to the
secondary document. The text displayed in the primary
document depends on the text contained in the
secondary document. Changes to the text of the
secondary document are reflected faithfully in the text
displayed by primary document. But those changes do
not change the primary document at all: it consists of
its own text and a link to the secondary document. It is
in part a mere conduit, which does not itself change
merely because of changes in what the conduit
conveys.
The result is that a detached signature on the
primary document continues to verify correctly despite
changes to the text it displays, if those changes reflect
changes not to the primary document but to the
secondary document.
This is an elementary example, and I hope not well
adapted to fraud; but the sophistication of modern
word-processing software, with its built-in scripting
engines and other facilities, is such that signing a file
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A detached signature operates
differently. Instead of operating purely
on text, it operates on the whole file,
treating it as an electronic object, a
collection of bits. 
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with a detached signature can give surprisingly little
assurance about the text to which the signature
appears to relate.
Genuine documents that fail to verify 
From “false” documents that verify correctly, consider
genuine ones that fail. Most users will have had the
experience of opening a document to read it, making
no changes, clicking the button to close it and being
met with a dialogue asking, “Do you want to save the
changes you made to Mutable.doc?” Those who
unwarily click “Yes” will find that while the text content
may not have changed, system changes have in fact
occurred – the document may record the date on which
it was last opened, for example, which may have been
changed by the mere fact of your having opened it to
read it. The result will be that Mutable.doc.sig can no
longer be used to verify Mutable.doc, because
although the text has not changed, not all the bits in
the file have remained identical, and a change to any
one of them is enough to prevent signature verification.
In the example given, the user would no longer be able
to use the signature to prove the genuineness of the
signed document.
The solution in this case is to change the status of
the signed file to “read only” immediately after
signature; and it would be a desirable property of
signature software that by default it should make such
a change to protect the unwary user.
Security advantages of detached signatures 
In the face of these examples of the perils of using
detached signatures, what good reason is there to use
them in preference to in-line signatures? There are in
fact two different reasons for doing so.
The first is that in-line signatures can be applied only
to text. This is satisfactory for documents and e-mail
messages; but to sign a spreadsheet or a voice
message or a video, only a detached signature will
work. Anyone who contemplates signing files of that
kind should give careful thought to just what they
intend their signature to mean, and should make sure
that they have a common understanding with those
who will rely on the signature.
The untrustworthiness of general purpose
computers
The second reason for using detached signatures is
more complex. Reference was made above to the
importance of the ability of the signatory (a) to exclude
others from obtaining access to his signature key and
(b) to ensure that his signature creation device uses
the key only to sign documents he intends to sign.
Signature keys may be held in secure tokens (USB
devices or smartcards) and protected by passwords to
enhance the user’s ability to exclude others from
obtaining access to them. (Such devices may be
vulnerable to a sophisticated attack by a well-equipped
adversary, but the user should be alert to the loss of
the token and able to revoke the validity of the key so
as to frustrate such an attack.) The problem of ensuring
that the user signs only what he intends to sign is more
difficult, because in order to make a signature, the user
depends on a general purpose computer, and general
purpose computers are widely acknowledged to be
untrustworthy devices. In particular, they are
vulnerable to malicious software, which may give a
third party the power to carry out operations on the
user’s computer without his knowledge. Such
operations could include signing documents that are
not presented to the user on the screen.
The lack of secure signature-creation devices 
This problem could be solved by the deployment of
secure signature-creation devices of such limited
functionality as to be practically immune to such
attacks; or by the development and deployment of
general purpose computers rendered trustworthy by
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Most users will have had the experience of
opening a document to read it, making no
changes, clicking the button to close it and being
met with a dialogue asking, “Do you want to
save the changes you made to Mutable.doc?”
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technical means. It remains uncertain whether or when
any such deployment will take place. Digital signatures
have not proved to be the essential foundation for the
success of electronic commerce in quite the way their
promoters claimed ten years ago, and the market for
secure devices may not justify the investment required
(and may indeed have been distorted by the demands
of the entertainment industry for the deployment of
computers that satisfied the security requirements of
that industry instead of those of the users).
A helpful protocol 
In the absence of secure devices to solve this problem,
it may be possible in some cases to reduce the risks by
procedural means. Imagine an on-line banking system
in which important documents (instructions for the
payment of large amounts, for example) were signed by
the customer using a digital signature, perhaps after
some interaction between bank and customer through
“conventional” means such as a secure website and
the use of passwords. The risk in contemplation is that
while the customer thinks he is signing the bank’s
document in accordance with his intentions, a
malicious third party has unknown to him caused his
computer to replace the document he intended to sign
with one in favour of the third party. The bank could
guard against this risk by creating (and retaining) a
detached signature verifying its own document before
sending it to the customer. If the customer’s computer
signs a substituted document, the customer’s signature
will verify correctly; but the bank’s will not, since what
it gets back is not what it sent out. The third party
would have to compromise not just the customer’s
computer but also that of the bank, and would have to
co-ordinate activity between them. Such a compromise
would be substantially more difficult to achieve, and
the procedure would provide a corresponding measure
of protection.
In-line signatures hard to use with the protocol 
But in practice the procedure depends on the use of
detached signatures, and could not comfortably be
achieved with in-line signatures. If the bank creates a
detached signature in order to verify that the returned
document has not been changed, then the customer
must use a detached signature to sign it, because if the
customer uses an in-line signature, the document will
necessarily change by the inclusion of the signature,
and the bank’s check will fail. It is true that the bank
could send the document to the customer with an in-
line signature. The sophisticated customer may not
object to the appearance of the document (although
banks may not be confident of their customers’
sophistication in the matter); but in order to preserve
the bank’s ability to verify that the instruction was the
same as in the document it sent out, the customer
would have to sign the bank’s signature as well as the
text it signed. This is not impossible – the text within a
signature can be any text, including another signature –
but the effect is strange and the procedure might easily
be prone to errors.
To illustrate this, assume a payment instruction as
follows:
[Payment Instruction]
The bank sends this out signed:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
[Payment Instruction]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 7.0
iQA/AwUBRB6vrgkSrmaJndf/EQKDmwCeOMz4oyy
JJVZXa05qO72f0KSb/PIAnA69
QsCgiwyUdpM+oHqlGsBAefRG
=m8dV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
The customer sends this back signed in turn, with
both the payment instruction and the signature
included within his own signature:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
[Payment Instruction]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 7.0
iQA/AwUBRB6vrgkSrmaJndf/EQKDmwCeOMz4oyy
JJVZXa05qO72f0KSb/PIAnA69
QsCgiwyUdpM+oHqlGsBAefRG
=m8dV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP 7.0
iQA/AwUBRB6v7QkSrmaJndf/EQIEjACg+CynG4P
WRldOt8U7zsvsyWteWg0AoLZf
phtHcObcDaO7KCX/U8QSYM0v
=lfUv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
This a confusing procedure, to put it no higher, and
its commercial attractiveness must be doubted.
Conclusion 
Regrettably, there is no satisfactory solution that can
be offered at present. Detached signatures lend
themselves to advantageous use in a secure context,
such as between bank and customer where there is
mutual trust. (Although even there a dishonest
employee of the bank might try to use the linked file
technique to manipulate the customer’s instructions
and thereby defraud the bank.) But outside a trusted
environment, the use of detached signatures
introduces serious security vulnerabilities, and some
risks to reliability through mishandling of documents.
Methods of in-line signature which apply only to text,
and offer protection against invisible text, linked
documents or scripting techniques, provide users with
significant benefits.
Handwritten signatures have worked well for several
centuries. Perhaps it was always too much to hope that
satisfactory electronic replacements would emerge in
just a few years.
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